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Abstract
This paper examines the spatial dimension of marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for
reduction of nuclear risks through increased insurance coverage. The eﬀect of distance
from a nuclear power plant on individuals’ MWP is ambiguous. MWP is expected to de-
crease with distance because the risk of being aﬀected by an accident decreases. However,
if individuals choose their residential location taking the operational risk into account,
MWP is predicted to ﬁrst increase and later decrease with distance from the nuclear power
plant. On the other hand, there are risks associated with transportation and disposal of
nuclear waste where distance should matter only in the vicinity of the plant. These the-
oretical predictions are tested with data collected using a stated choice experiment. The
predictions are largely conﬁrmed by the evidence.
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1 Introduction
There are various risks associated with nuclear energy. The two most notable risks at the
energy production stage are accidents at the power plant and waste disposal. We employ a
stated choice experiment in order to elicit individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) for reducing
these risks. The importance of these risks is reﬂected in a signiﬁcant WTP for their reduction.
Economic theory predicts that WTP for reducing the risk of a nuclear power plant accident
depends on an individuals’ location. Especially, individuals with high risk aversion or high
subjective risk estimates will tend to locate farther away from nuclear power plants. Because
there are many other factors that determine an individual’s residential location, distance from
the plant is expected to have an eﬀect only on those individuals’ WTP who judge nuclear risks
to be important enough. It is shown that the WTP estimates do indeed depend in a subtle
way on distance from the plant conforming the theoretical predictions.
The present study purports to test these predictions using data from a stated choice ex-
periment (SCE) conducted in 2001 with Swiss individuals. It is of particular interest for two
reasons. First, most of the existing published work dealing with the eﬀect of distance on the
WTP for externality mitigation focuses on housing prices. By way of contrast, this contri-
bution reports on WTP values derived from market experiments yielding measurements of
demand uncontaminated by supply conditions. Second, the evidence comes from Switzerland,
a country where residents have been having full opportunity to choose their location in re-
sponse to nuclear externalities.
Decreasing the (ﬁnancial) risk of nuclear power plant accidents was framed in terms of
increasing mandatory liability insurance carried by nuclear plant operators. At present, opera-
tors are obliged to insure for CHF 1 billion (bn.) (approx. US$ 0.8 bn. [US$ 1 ≈ CHF 1.2), an
amount that will hardly be suﬃcient to compensate the victims of a major accident. However,
an extension of coverage will c.p. result in higher consumer prices for electricity. This also
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holds true for any conceivable solution to the problem of nuclear waste, since in Switzerland
35 percent of electricity is provided through nuclear power (most of the remainder comimg
from hydro sources).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After a review of the literature deal-
ing with the spatial eﬀects of externalities associated with nuclear power, section 3 presents a
model of locational choice and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Next, section 4 describes
the SCE that was applied to measure WTP of the Swiss population for reducing nuclear exter-
nalities. The econometric speciﬁcation, based on the Random Utility Model, is presented in
section 5. Estimation results and hypothesis tests follow in section 6, while concluding remarks
are oﬀered in section 7.
2 Review of the Literature
Choosing one’s optimal location with respect to the risk of being aﬀected by an externality can
be viewed as self-insurance. By locating farther away from a nuclear power plant, individuals
reduce their losses e.g. due to radiation in case of a severe accident. Ehrlich and Becker (1972)
analyze the eﬀect of the simultaneous availability of self-insurance and market insurance and
conclude that both ``technologies’’ are substitutes as long as the price of market insurance is
independent of the amount of self-insurance.
Since up to now it has not been possible for Swiss citizens to buy insurance against nuclear
risks, the only option available is self-insurance. In the absence of an insurance market, the
optimal level of self-insurance thus increases with increased risk aversion (see for instance
Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1985). Therefore, more strongly risk-averse individuals are predicted
to spend more resources on loss mitigation than do less risk-averse consumers.
The experiment conducted in the present study introduces a hypothetical insurance mar-
ket. Evidently, respondents in this experiment state their WTP for nuclear insurance after hav-
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ing set their optimal level of self-insurance through their residential choice. Although there
is no need to account for strategic interaction between market insurance and self-insurance
(Kelly and Kleﬀner, 2003), it is necessary to account for self-insurance that has taken place
prior to the experiment. Thus, estimated WTP for insurance coverage is expected to vary sys-
tematically with the degree of self-insurance, i.e. residential location in the present context.
There is a large body of empirical work estimating the eﬀect of proximity to a source of
disamenity on property values. The case of nuclear power plants was ﬁrst studied by Nelson
(1981) and Gamble and Downing (1982). In the wake of the 1979 incident at Three Mile Island,
they ﬁnd weak or even reversed distance eﬀects, viz. higher property values in the vicinity of
the plant. Folland and Hough (2000) extend their focus beyond a single power plant, analyzing
a panel data set of broad market areas across the United States. Their evidence points to a neg-
ative impact of nuclear power plants on land prices, with distance again having an ambiguous
eﬀect.
However, Gawande and Jenkins-Smith (2001) ﬁnd that being ﬁve miles away from a nuclear
waste shipment route was associated with a 3 percent increase of average house value compared
to property on the route.
While important, nuclear power is only one of several sources of disamenities. In their
review, Gawande and Jenkins-Smith (2001) conclude that a wide range of disamenities such
as Superfund sites and polluted water negatively inﬂuence the value of residential property.
More speciﬁcally Faber (1998), collecting evidence on the eﬀects of distance, ﬁnds that their
magnitude depends on the type of facility, community characteristics, and setting (rural or
urban). Chemical reﬁneries and nuclear power plants seem to have roughly comparable (pos-
itive) gradients, amounting to $200-300 per mile of distance (in 1993 dollars). Compared to
other facilities, this is a rather small eﬀect, as a proposed radioactive waste disposal site was
associated with a gradient of $4,440 per mile. As Clark and Allison (1999) found in their study,
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the distance eﬀect weakens over time, suggesting that relocation of individuals may replenish
demand for property close to the source of the externality by those who believe to be little
aﬀected, a consideration taken up in section 3.
Most of these studies rely on hedonic modeling, linking price data to a set of character-
istics of real estate property. Davis (2005) applies this method to estimate marginal WTP to
avoid the risk of leukemia in children. As he points out, the heterogeneity of individuals (with
respect to income or preferences in general) contaminates housing price data. Furthermore,
the cost of changing location, which constitutes the cost of this particular self-insurance tech-
nology, is arguably not trivial. Moreover, market prices also depend on supply which in turn
is aﬀected by zoning laws and building regulations. For these reasons, estimates of individual
WTP derived from analyzing the compensating diﬀerentials contained in market data are po-
tentially distorted and incomplete. Experimental evidence, while having its own drawbacks
(see Diamond and Hausmann, 1994), may thus complement information gleaned from market
data.
For example, Smith and Desvousges (1986) analyze the impact of a waste disposal facility
on the subjective value of a residential site using a contingent valuation experiment. For haz-
ardous waste, they obtain a positive distance gradient of $330-$495 per mile. A study related
to the present paper is by Riddel, Dwyer, and Shaw (2003), who estimate the eﬀect of sev-
eral planned nuclear waste transportation routes from power plants to the Yucca Mountain
(Nevada)  repository. They ﬁnd evidence that perceived risk decreases with distance to the
planned transportation route and that higher perceived risk results in a higher probability of
moving away from the route.
As opposed to Riddel, Dwyer, and Shaw (2003), this study does not consider a planned
future change in the environment. Rather, it seeks to measure WTP for a reduction of two
risks emanating from nuclear power plants that have been eﬀective for at least two decades.
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Respondents had ample opportunity to relocate according to their preferences regarding nu-
clear risks. The present investigation therefore estimates the net disutility caused by two types
of nuclear risk (one associated with current operation, the other with transportation of waste)
given the respondents’ amount of self-insurance through locational choice.
3 A Model of Locational Choice
This section is devoted to the formulation of a simple model of locational choice designed to
predict the spatial distribution of marginal willingness to pay for risk reduction.
Assume a linear space with a nuclear power plant located at point s = 0 and maximum
distance, s = 1. An individual i is characterized by its position si on the interval and his or
her perceived (subjective) probability pi of an accident at the plant. Initially, individuals are
uniformly distributed in space, resulting in a bivariate uniform distribution (si, pi) of distances
and probabilities in the [0, 1]× [0, 1] plane.
In case of accident, individual i suﬀers a ﬁnancial loss that depends on distance from plant.
For simplicity, let this loss be (1− si)L such that an individual located at si = 1 suﬀers no loss.
With m denoting money wealth, expected utility of individual i is
V (pi, si) = (1− pi)u(m) + piu (m− (1− si)L) . (1)
Note that u(m) is assumed to be the same for all individuals. Heterogeneity is thus uniquely
captured by diﬀerences in the subjective assessment of pi, the probability of an accident, and
si, the location in space.
If individuals in this situation were given the possibility to buy a marginal loss reduction,
they would be willing to pay
W (pi, si) ≡ − @Vi/@L
@Vi/@m
. (2)
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Using (1), this leads to
W (pi, si) =
pi(1− si) · u0 [m− (1− si)L]
(1− pi) · u0 [m] + pi · u0 [m− (1− si)L] . (3)
Note that for concave u (u0 > 0 and u00 < 0) we have @W/@si ≤ 0 but @W/@pi ≥ 0.
For given pi, the marginal WTP for loss reduction is thus decreasing with distance, while
for a given distance si, marginal WTP increases with subjective accident probability pi. The
spatial pattern of marginal WTP values is thus predicted to exhibit a negative distance gradient
(@W/@si < 0).
However, since individuals diﬀer with respect to location and type, the initial (uniform)
distribution of types allows for mutually beneﬁcial trade. An individual of type (si, pi) will
trade with individual j if si ≤ sj but pi ≥ pj , with at least one inequality being strict. Thus
if i is located closer to the plant but has higher subjective accident probability than j, both
individuals gain from switching locations.
Suppose that individuals are pairwise matched randomly. If individual i meets individual
j, who is located at a greater distance (sj > si) to the power plant but has a lower estimate of
nuclear risk (pj < pi),
By switching location with i, individual j on the other hand loses V (pj , si)−V (pj , sj) < 0.
But since pj < pi, the utility loss of individual j is smaller than the utility gain of individual
i. Assuming that no individual faces a wealth constraint, such a mutually beneﬁcial trade will
take place and i and j thus switch location. Summing up, whenever two individuals i and j 6= i
with
ρij ≡ (pi − pj)(si − sj) < 0 (4)
are matched, they switch location and realize a positive net gain from doing so. Note that
sign(ρij) reﬂects the correlation of the two individuals i and j. Before they switch location
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(pi,si)
no trade
1
0
1
45°
(pj,sj)
Figure 1: Trading opportunities of individual i with endowment (pi, si).
we have sign(ρij) = −1 while after the switch we have sign(ρij) = +1. A repeated process
of pairwise random matching gradually leads to more and more individuals being positively
correlated. When all individuals are positively correlated with all other individuals then there
are no more opportunities for trade left. The following Lemma summarizes this argument.
Lemma 1. The ﬁnal a"ocation has a"  individuals distributed on the 45-degree line in(p, s)-space,
i.e. sk = pk for every individual k.
Proof. As long as there are two individuals i and j for which (pi − pj)(si − sj) < 0, they will
switch locations. Only if all individuals are on the 45-degree line, i.e. if pk = sk for all k, are
opportunities for mutually beneﬁcial trade exhausted.
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s
s(1− s)
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∞(s)
u0(m−L)
u0(m)
s0
Figure 2: Marginal willingness to pay (Wˆ (s)) in the general case: Wˆ (s) = ∞(s) · s(1− s).
Lemma 1 assumes zero relocation costs. If there are costs to relocation, the main point still
carries over.1 Exhausting all proﬁtable opportunities for trade still results in a positive but no
longer perfect correlation between location and subjective accident probability.
Consider next, how marginal willingness to pay varies with distance after sorting. Using
Lemma 1, equation (3) now reads
W (pi = si, si) =
si(1− si) · u0 [m− (1− si)L]
(1− si) · u0 [m] + si · u0 [m− (1− si)L] . (5)
To illustrate the consequences of Lemma 1, consider the case of risk neutrality. In this case,
equation (5) simpliﬁes to
W (pi = si, si) = si(1− si). (6)
1Clearly, if costs are so high as to render trade unproﬁtable, this model no longer applies.
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This is a quadratic function which is zero at si = 0 and si = 1 and attains its maximum at
si = 12. After sorting, MWP is thus no longer a decreasing function of distance but shows
an inverted U-shaped relationship. Lemma 2 shows that this property holds for any concave
utility function.
Lemma 2. If u is concave then marginal wi"ingness to pay after sorting is
Wˆ (s) ≡W (p = s, s) = s(1− s) · ∞(s), (7)
with
∞(s) ≡ u
0 (m− (1− s)L)
(1− s) · u0 (m) + s · u0 (m− (1− s)L) . (8)
Wˆ (s) has inverted U shape.
Proof. The ﬁrst term of Wˆ (s) = s(1− s) · ∞(s) is inverted U shape. Since u0 [m− (1− s)L] ≥
u0[m], it follows that ∞(s) ≥ 1. Furthermore, ∞[0] = u0(m−L)u0(m) > 1 and ∞[1] = 1.
Let k(s) ≡ {(1− s)u0[m] + su0 [m− (1− s)L]}2. The sign of the derivative of ∞(s) with
respect to s is then equal to the sign of
∞0(s)k(s) =
u00[m− (1− s)L]L · £(1− s)u0[m] + su0[m− (1− s)L]§
− u0[m− (1− s)L] £−u0[m] + u0[m− (1− s)L] + su00[m− (1− s)L]L§ .
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This expression can be rewritten as
∞0(s)k(s) =
<0z }| {
u00[m− (1− s)L]L(1− s)u0[m]
− u0[m− (1− s)L] £u0[m− (1− s)L]− u0[m]§| {z }
≥0
≤ 0.
∞0(s) is smaller than zero because u00 < 0 and u0 > 0 due to concavity of u. In sum, ∞(s) is
always greater or equal to one and is strictly decreasing in s. At s = 1, ∞ is one and its slope is
zero.
Recall that Wˆ (s) = ∞(s)f(s) with f(s) = s(1− s). Then Wˆ 0(s) = ∞0(s)f(s) + ∞(s)f 0(s).
Let s0 denote the distance at which f 0[s0] = 0, i.e. where f is  maximum. At this point,
Wˆ 0[s0] = ∞0[s0]f [s0] < 0 since ∞0[s0] < 0. Furthermore, Wˆ 0[0] = ∞[0]f 0[0] > 0 since ∞ ≥ 1 and
f 0[0] > 0. Consequently, Wˆ (s) must attain a maximum in (0, s0). Note that this maximum is
at s < s0. Refer to Figure 2 for an illustration.
3.1 Simulation With a CARA Utility Function
Up to this point, the analysis neglected wealth eﬀects. When individuals carry out all these
mutually beneﬁcial trades, they not only switch location but they also transfer wealth. More
speciﬁcally, individuals beneﬁting from the switch of location transfer wealth to the other
individuals in order to compensate them for the loss in utility associated with living closer to
the nuclear power plant. Therefore, each switch of locations also changes wealth endowments.
This section reports simulation results which take these wealth eﬀects into account. It is
shown that all the previous results remain valid.
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Let u(m) = −e− 1∞m. In this case, the coeﬃcient for (absolute) risk aversion is − u0u00 = ∞.
Consider the case where sj > si and pj < pi. Then individual i‘s gain in utility from switching
location with j can be oﬀset by a decrease in wealth by ti, with ti deﬁned by
ti = (1−pi)u(mi−ti)+piu (mi − (1− sj)L− ti) = (1−pi)u(mi)+piu (mi − (1− si)L) . (9)
Substituting for u(m) and solving for ti, one obtains
ti = ∞ ln
"
(1− pi) + pie
1
∞ (1−si)L
(1− pi) + pie
1
∞ (1−sj)L
#
> 0. (10)
Analogously, individual j can be compensated by an increase in wealth so that he or she is just
indiﬀerent between switching location and not switching. Put diﬀerently, j‘s loss in utility
from switching location with i is equal to a reduction of wealth by tj , with
tj = ∞ ln
"
(1− pj) + pje
1
∞ (1−sj)L
(1− pj) + pje
1
∞ (1−si)L
#
< 0. (11)
Since pi > pj , the net gain from switching location is
∆ ≡ ti + tj > 0. (12)
We do not consider how the two individuals bargain over the distribution of this net gain but
simply assume that they split it equally. Wealth after trade (m0i,m0j) is then given by
m0i = mi + tj +
ti+tj
2 (13)
m0j = mj − tj + ti+tj2 . (14)
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Figure 3: Simulation results with a CARA utility function.
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The simulation proceeds as follows.2 Initially n individuals are randomly allocated to a
point in [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Moreover, all individuals are endowed with the same level of wealth.
Next, two individuals are chosen randomly. If there are potential gains from switching location,
i.e. if condition (4) holds, they switch locations and transfer wealth according to eqs. (13) and
(14). After this transaction is concluded, a new pair of individuals is matched. This process
continues until there have been no proﬁtable matches for a predetermined number of rounds.
Figure 3 depicts the result of this simulation. The top left panel shows the initial distri-
bution of individuals in (p, s)-space. Taking this allocation as given, the top right panel shows
each individuals marginal willingness to pay with distance from the power plant on the x-axis.
The lower left panel then shows the allocation of individuals in (p, s)-space after sorting. It
is in accordance with Lemma 1 which states that all individuals are concentrated on the 45-
degree line. As a consequence, marginal willingness to pay after sorting is inverted U-shaped,
as depicted in the lower right panel (this conﬁrms Lemma 2).
3.2 The Confounding Eﬀect of Locational Choice
The analysis in the previous section predicts respondents to be sorted according to distance
from nuclear power plants, with the more skeptical types to be found farther away from the
plant. Therefore, people located farther away from the plant may well be willing to pay more
for additional insurance coverage against operational risk than those located in its vicinity.
Whether the distance gradient of WTP for risk reduction w.r.t operational risk is positive or
negative thus depends on the amount of sorting that took place. Prior to sorting, those living
farther away from the plant would be characterized by a low risk of radiation, causing their
WTP for coverage of ﬁnancial loss to be reduced.
2The SciLab code is available from the authors upon request.
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Nuclear risk is but one of many factors governing the choice of residential location. Em-
ployment opportunities, proximity to the family, recreational considerations, etc. all aﬀect
the choice of one’s residence. Hence, there is a signiﬁcant cost associated with relocating,
and sorting with respect to operational risk is expected to be less than perfect. However, the
stronger a person’s attitude towards nuclear risk, the greater is the weight this risk obtains
in consumer’s decisions. Only persons with a strong negative attitude, high perceived risk or
marked risk aversion are expected to rank operational risks high enough so that the sorting-
eﬀect becomes measurable in the available data. Put diﬀerently, to the extent that estimation
succeeds in controlling for attitude and perceived risk, the distance gradient should be nega-
tive, i.e. WTP for additional insurance coverage should decrease with distance from plant. If,
on the other hand, rsik selection is not controlled for then an inverted U shape relationship
between distance from the plant and WTP for coverage of ﬁnancial loss is expected.
Three indicators for respondents’ attitude towards nuclear power plant are used in the
estimation, (1) whether they perceive nuclear accidents to be much more likely than experts’
best estimates (P,SSIMIST), (2) whether they state to be opposed to nuclear energy in principle
(OPPON,NT), and as an inverse indicator, (3) male sex (S,XM). The last indicator is based on
several  studies. Hartog, i Carbonell, and Jonker (2002) analyze the inﬂuence of individual
characteristics on risk aversion and ﬁnd survey evidence that men are less risk-averse than
women. Nielsen, Gyrd-Hansen, Kristiansen, and Nexoe (2003) conclude that men have a lower
perception of risks than women. S,XM is therefore predicted to display a negative relationship
with WTP.
There is possibly another eﬀect of gender on WTP.3 Recognizing that households rather
than individuals choose their residential location, the intra-household decision process aﬀects
the degree of sorting of its constituting individuals. Suppose that on average the main bread-
3In Section 6 we show that women do indeed have signiﬁcantly higher WTP for risk reduction than men.
However, their WTP monotonically decreases with distance from the plant as opposed to men’s WTP.
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winners’ preferences are reﬂected in a household’s locational decision concerning residence.
In this case, only the main breadwinner’s WTP for reduction of risk due to operational risk
is expected to be inverted U-shaped, while the other household members’ (who did not sort)
WTP should be decreasing with distance. Because in Switzerland the main breadwinners are
predominantly men and until recently had the legal authority to decide about the residential
location of a household, it is expected that they are more strongly sorted than women. Inter-
acting S,XM with DISTANC, controls for this eﬀect.
Unlike with operational risks, individuals who fear the risk from nuclear waste transport
or disposal gain little from putting more distance between their residence and a nuclear power
plant.4 Therefore, DISTANC, should not be a relevant predictor of WTP for solving the prob-
lem of nuclear waste (WTPW ). This statement needs to be qualiﬁed in the following way.
Shippings of radioactive waste and spent fuel necessarily originate from plants, from where
they will be directed to the future national disposal site (at present, destinations are Le Hague
in France and Sellaﬁeld in Great Britain). This implies that there is and will be an increased
exposure to the risk of nuclear waste in the vicinity of the plant. For most values of DISTANC,,
however, the eﬀect of distance on WTPW is expected to be zero.
3.3 Hypotheses to Be Tested
The preceding arguments may be summed up as follows. (1) Marginal WTP for higher liability
insurance coverage (MWPC ) may decrease or increase with distance from the nearest nuclear
plant, depending on whether the direct eﬀect of distance (risk eﬀect) or the indirect sorting
eﬀect prevails. If sorting prevails, MWPC is expected to be inverted U-shaped with respect to
distance. (2) By controlling for respondents’ attitude and gender, an attempt is made to iden-
tify the direct eﬀect of distance. This eﬀect on WTP is predicted to be a negative function of
4Although a waste disposal site has not been designated yet, geological considerations make it unlikely that a
future waste disposal site will be near existing plants (which are all located on rivers).
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distance to plant. (3) WTP for solving the waste (and hence transportation) problem (WTPW )
is predicted not to depend on distance, except in the immediate vicinity of the plant. (4) Ce-
teris paribus, increasing values of MWPC and WPTW are expected with higher income since
the marginal utility loss caused by the increase in the price of electricity caused by stepping up
liability insurance requirements should be decreasing in income.
4 The Stated Choice Experiment
4.1 Methodology
In stated-choice experiments (SCE), respondents are confronted with hypothetical choice sit-
uations where they have to decide whether they prefer the status quo or some alternative prod-
uct (which potentially diﬀers in all product attributes). For each such choice set, respondents
have to indicate their preferred choice, which requires them to trade oﬀ one set of attributes
against the other, implicitly revealing their preferences regarding the diﬀerent attributes.
The SCE approach started with McFadden (1974) and was further developed by Louvie`re
and Hensher (1982). An overview is given by Louvie`re, Hensher, and Swait (2001). More re-
cently, it has become popular in energy and health economics (Johnson and Desvousges, 1997;
Johnson, Ruby, and Desvousges, 1998; Telser, 2002). In the context of nuclear energy risks,
SCE have been found to yield qualitatively and quantitatively plausible results (Schneider and
Zweifel,  2004). However, that study neglects the spatial dimension of risk associated both
with the operation and waste disposal of nuclear plants.
4.2 Experimental Design
In the present context, the SCE method has individuals choose among diﬀerent types of elec-
tricity. During the decision process, the attributes (among them price) of electricity are traded
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Attribute Levels (Codingc) Unit Status quo
PRIC, 0; 10; 30; 60 (0;...;60) percent 0
BLACKOuTS 2; 14 (0;1) number/year 2
NOWAST, unresolved problems (1); unresolved
no unresolved problems (0) problems
DAMAG,a 0.1; 10; 100; 200 (0.1;...;200) CHF bn. 200
COV,RAG,b 1; 20; 50; 100 (1;...;100) percent 1
a Values in US$ bn: 0.065; 6.5; 65; 130 (CHF 1 ∼ US$1.2)
b Coverage in percent of loss
c Bold for status quo
Table 1: Levels of attributes.
oﬀ against each other. Participants in the experiment are asked to pairwise evaluate several
diﬀerent electricity products by indicating their preferred choice. By observing a number of
choices, it is possible to approximate an indiﬀerence curve in attribute space and therefore es-
timate how much income (through higher electricity prices) respondents are prepared to give
up in return for an increased amount of some other desired attribute.
For a SCE, it is necessary to deﬁne the product under consideration (here: electricity) by
but a few relevant attributes. In a telephone survey preceding the main survey, 500 Swiss resi-
dents were asked to indicate how important they considered several electricity attributes. The
following ﬁve emerged as the most important: size of area exposed to hazard (DAMAG,), secure
and sustainable waste disposal (NOWAST,), reliability deﬁned as low frequency of blackouts
(BLACKOuT), ﬁnancial compensation of victims in case of an accident (COV,RAG,), and average
price per kwh (PRIC,). Since the study is concerned with insurance against ﬁnancial risks of a
nuclear accident, DAMAG, was deﬁned as billions of CHF at risk rather than area exposed to
hazard. Although this study focusses on ﬁnancial risks, health risk concerns by respondents
are also picked up as long as they are expressed as the desire for increased insurance coverage.
The relevant attributes are summarized in Table 1.
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Description Mean Median Std. dev.
DISTANC, distance in kilometers from respondent’s 45 36 30
residence to nearest nuclear power plant
P,SSIMIST = 1 if respondent considered a nuclear 0.59 1 0.49
accident at least ten times more probable
than experts
OPPON,NT = 1 if respondent said to be against 0.21 0 0.41
nuclear energy even if there was no waste
disposal problem
S,XM = 1 if respondent is male 0.52 1 0.5
INCOM, yearly income in CHF. Seven income 47,500 60,000 35,400
categories were used in the questionnaire.
44 percent did not reveal their income
INC MISSG = 1 if income missing 0.44 0 0.5
Table 2: Sample description of explanatory variables.
The questionnaire for the main survey was divided in three parts: warm-up questions, the
actual choice experiment, and socioeconomic information. In the ﬁrst part, data on monthly
electricity  outlay, attitudes towards nuclear energy, and the importance of choice between
diﬀerent types of electricity was collected. Respondents then had to read a description of
the risks of nuclear and hydro power plants (document with exact wording available from the
authors). Emphasis was put on possible worst-case scenarios and their ﬁnancial consequences.
Respondents were also told that nuclear power plants were already mandated to have liability
insurance but that coverage fell far short of possible ﬁnancial loss in case of a major accident.
The federal government would possibly provide relief by imposing a special tax. Alternatively,
mandated insurance coverage could be stepped up to reduce reliance on the tax system.
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of the actual DCE. Respondents were con-
fronted with 14 diﬀerent choice situations where they had to decide whether they preferred a
proposed type of power to the status quo. Note that respondents could always opt out by stat-
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ing “cannot decide”. In the third and last part of the questionnaire, standard socioeconomic
data was collected, summarized in Table 2. Speciﬁcally, DISTANC, from the nearest nuclear
power plant was calculated using Zip codes provided by respondents. P,SSIMIST=1 obtains if
on a visual analog scale, respondents marked their estimated accident probability at least one
order of magnitude higher than experts.
Moreover, respondents were asked to indicate their income. Since more than 40 percent of
respondents refused to indicate their income, restricting the sample to those individuals with
information on income had to be avoided. The solution retained is to equate missing values to
zero (INCOM, = 0) while creating a dummy variable INC MISSG that takes on the value of one if
income information is not available. Interaction terms are limited to OuTLAY; this is suﬃcient
to represent diﬀerences in marginal utility of income.
Face-to-face interviews were performed with randomly drawn respondents in the German-
speaking part of Switzerland during September and October 2001 (in the aftermath of 9/11). In
total, 391 persons were interviewed. Each respondent evaluated 14 choice scenarios, resulting
in 5,474 recorded decisions. After excluding ``cannot decide’’ answers and missing values, a
total of 4,613 observations were retained.
5 Econometric Speciﬁcation
Let an individual be confronted with a discrete choice, e.g. whether to buy a certain product or
not. Given this choice, individuals maximize their (expected) utility with respect to their bud-
get constraints, obtaining certain utility values. These values deﬁne an indirect utility function
that depends on individuals’ characteristics, their incomes, on the attributes of the alterna-
tive (including price) as well as on various unobservable and therefore random eﬀects (random
utility speciﬁcation, see McFadden, 2001).
20
In the present stated choice experiment (SCE), respondents were confronted with 14 bi-
nary choice situations, involving the status quo and an alternative. The dependent variable yi
equals one if respondents chose the alternative and zero if they stayed with the status quo. Re-
spondent i‘s indirect utility of the alternative in choice situation j is denoted by Vij ; the one of
the status quo, by Vmj. Respondents therefore chose the alternative (yi = 1) if Vij − Vim ≥ 0.
In keeping with the theory laid out in section 3, the utility function reads
Vij = β0 + β1 · COV,RAG,j + β2 · NOWAST,j + β3 · BLACKOuTj + β4 · DAMAG,j
+ β5 · OuTLAYj + β6 · OuTLAY2j + β7 · DISTi · NOWAST,j + β8 · DIST2i · NOWAST,j
+ β9 · DISTi · DAMAG,j + β10 · DIST2i · DAMAG,j + β11 · DISTi · COV,RAG,j
+ β12 · DIST2i · COV,RAG,j + . . . + ≤ij .
(15)
Since the status quo remains the same for each individual during the experiment, the error term
≤im in the utility function for the status quo does not change. This amounts to an individual-
speciﬁc error term µi ≡ ≤im. Since only diﬀerences Vij − Vim are relevant for an individual’s
decision, the error term of the estimated function is given by µi − ≤ij , calling for a random ef-
fects speciﬁcation. Furthermore, regressors such as OuTLAYj are measured as diﬀerences from
the status quo, causing socioeconomic variables to drop out of the equation unless interacted
with regressors that vary between situations.
The random eﬀects probit model was estimated using maximum likelihood. The estimated
utility function permits to calculate marginal WTP for the diﬀerent product attributes, deﬁned
as the marginal utility of the attribute divided by the marginal utility of income,
MWPi(COV,RAG,) :=
@Vˆi/@COV,RAG,
@Vˆi/@OuTLAY
. (16)
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In the case of WTP for solving the nuclear waste problem, one has
WPi(NOWAST,) :=
Vˆi[NOWAST, = 1]− Vˆi[NOWAST, = 0]
@Vˆi/@OuTLAY
. (17)
MWP values reported are in US$ per year. Note that INCOM,i· OuTLAYj and OuTLAY2j permit
marginal utility of income to vary with income. Using the delta method (see Greene, 2003, p.
70), standard errors of MWP are derived from the standard errors of the parameters contained
in the estimated utility function.
6 Results
Estimation results are displayed in Table 5. All coeﬃcients of product attributes (COV,RAG,,
NOWAST,, BLACKOuT, OuTLAY, OuTLAY2) with the exception of DAMAG, show the expected sign
and are highly signiﬁcant, indicating that respondents were (on average) willing to make trade-
oﬀs among the diﬀerent attributes. Furthermore, the relative magnitudes of marginal utilities
associated with product attributes are intuitively plausible. Note that COV,RAG, measures
the increase in insurance coverage in percentage points, whereas NOWAST, is an all-or-nothing
variable indicating whether or not there are any problems regarding nuclear waste. There are
several indications that the hypotheses formulated in section 3.3 may be conﬁrmed. (1) While
DIST·COV,RAG, has a negative coeﬃcient, the one of DIST·P,SSIMIST·COV,RAG, is positive,
signiﬁcantly reducing the overall eﬀect of DISTANC,. (2) Non-pessimistic women (S,XM=0 and
P,SSIMIST=0) show a strong negative distance gradient for MWPC whereas pessimistic men
show a positive distance gradient for MWPC. These ﬁndings indicate that S,XM and P,S-
SIMIST are able to control for respondents’ attitudes. (3) The coeﬃcient of DIST·COV,RAG, is
signiﬁcant, that of DIST·NOWAST, not, exactly as predicted. (4) Higher income mitigates the
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Coeﬀ. s.e.
CONSTANT 0.62489 0.09024 ***
COV,RAG, 0.02053 0.00424 ***
NOWAST, 0.35806 0.17971 **
BLACKOuT -0.35731 0.04953 ***
DAMAG, -0.00034 0.00087
OuTLAY -0.00339 0.00029 ***
OuTLAY2 1.17E-07 1.11E-08 ***
DIST·NOWAST, 0.00556 0.00637
DIST2·NOWAST, -3.20E-05 5.08E-05
DIST·DAMAG, -2.95E-05 3.58E-05
DIST2·DAMAG, 3.80E-08 2.95E-07
DIST·COV,RAG, -5.39E-04 1.74E-04 ***
DIST2·COV,RAG, 3.35E-06 1.43E-06 **
S,XM·NOWAST, -0.18718 0.09561 **
S,XM·COV,RAG, -0.01489 0.00426 ***
DIST·S,XM·COV 4.24E-04 1.77E-04 **
DIST2·S,XM·COV -2.11E-06 1.47E-06
P,SS·NOWAST, 0.09246 0.09762
P,SS·COV,RAG, -0.01148 0.00451 **
DIST·P,SS·COV 4.04E-04 1.86E-04 **
DIST2·P,SS·COV -2.24E-06 1.54E-06
OPPON,NT·NOWAST, 0.33556 0.12145 ***
OPPON,NT·COV,RAG, 0.00194 0.00528
DIST·OPP·COV -1.45E-05 2.11E-04
DIST2·OPP·COV -4.02E-07 1.64E-06
INCOM,·OuTLAY 8.16E-09 2.81E-09 ***
NOINCOM,·OuTLAY 6.94E-04 3.15E-04 **
lnσ2u 0.10630 0.11006
σu 1.05459 0.05803
ρ 0.52655 0.02744
N=4, 613; 376 respondents; LogL = −2196.79; L0 = −2596.96
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ signiﬁcant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level
Table 3: Random eﬀects probit estimation results. Dependent variable is the probability of
accepting the alternative type of power.
23
Value s.e.
MWP ∗)C
pessimistic men 0.91 0.38
pessimistic women 1.56 0.41
non-pessimistic men 0.86 0.36
non-pessimistic women 1.52 0.40
WTPW
pessimistic men 117.55 25.64
pessimistic women 169.71 28.18
non-pessimistic men 91.79 25.76
non-pessimistic women 143.95 27.37
*) for a percentage point change, e.g. from 1 to 2 percent
of maximum loss
Table 4: Marginal willingness to pay for increased coverage (MWPC ) and for solving the waste
disposal problem (WTPW ), evaluated at median distance (36 km) in US$ per year.
disutility caused by higher outlay on electricity (INCOM,·OuTLAY has a positive coeﬃcient),
pointing to diminishing marginal utility of income.
Respondents are not only concerned about the risks associated with nuclear energy (COV,RAG,,
NOWAST,), but also about the frequency of power outages (BLACKOuT) and about the cost of
electricity (OuTLAY and OuTLAY2), with the positive coeﬃcient of OuTLAY2 pointing to a dimin-
ishing marginal disutility of loss of income and hence decreasing marginal utility of income.
6.1 The Eﬀect of Attitudinal Variables on WTP
Using eq. (16), MWP is evaluated for diﬀerent values of S,XM and P,SSIMIST while keeping
the remaining variables at their median values. The results in Table 4 reproduce the well-
known fact of women being more concerned with the well-being of future generations than
men. This was already borne out by the negative coeﬃcient of S,XM·COV,RAG, in Table 5. Men
(S,XM=1) value neither additional insurance coverage nor solving the waste disposal problem as
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Figure 4: Marginal willingness to pay for increased coverage with respect to distance (measured
in km) from nuclear power plant, in US$ per year. The thin lines show the 95 percent conﬁ-
dence intervals.
much as do women (S,XM=0). WTP values reported in Table 4 suggest that pessimistic women
are willing to pay 70 percent more than comparable men for a marginal increase in insurance
coverage (1.52 US$/year compared to 0.91 US$/year) and roughly 45 percent more than men for
solving the waste disposal problem (170 US$/year compared to 118 US$/year). This diﬀerential
is similar for non-pessimistic women in relative terms, viz. some 75 percent w.r.t. coverage and
55 percent w.r.t. waste disposal.
6.2 The Eﬀect of Distance on WTP
As expounded in section 3, economic theory makes several predictions of considerable detail
regarding the eﬀects of DISTANC, on MWP for coverage and WTP for resolving the waste
problem. Speciﬁcally, prediction (2) states that controlling for attitudinal variables in the re-
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gression makes a diﬀerence by identifying the (negative) direct eﬀect of distance from plant
on MWPC. This means that pessimists (P,SS=1) should exhibit a positive eﬀect (note that the
coeﬃcient for DIST·P,SS·COV,RAG, in Table 5 is positive). In accordance with the argument
in Section 3.2, which hypothesized that men are more strongly sorted than women, a positive
coeﬃcient of DIST·S,XM·COV is found. Finally, it is expected that opponents (OPPON,NT=1) to
nuclear energy should exhibit a positive eﬀect as well (here, the coeﬃcient of DIST·OPP·COV is
negative but lacks signiﬁcance). In all, hypothesis (2) is largely conﬁrmed.
Turning to the waste problem, hypothesis (3) states that sorting should not make a diﬀer-
ence w.r.t. WTPW . Indeed, both DIST·NOWAST, and DIST2·NOWAST, fail to attain statistical
signiﬁcance. Prediction (4) is that higher income should go along with higher value of both
MWPC and WPTW . Indeed, the negative partial eﬀect of OuTLAY is mitigated by a positive
one associated with INCOM,·OuTLAY. Therefore, the denominator in equations (16) and (17)
goes towards zero with increasing income, causing MWPC and WTPW to go up since the
numerator is constant. Judging from the positive coeﬃcient of NOINCOM,·OuTLAY, this eﬀect
is particularly marked among respondents who decline to report their income.
Since the indicators P,SSIMIST, OPPON,NT and S,XM are designed to capture the sorting
eﬀect, the WTP of non-pessimistic women not opposed to nuclear energy (P,SSIMIST=0, OPPO-
N,NT=0, S,XM=0) for more comprehensive insurance coverage should be decreasing in distance
from plant, by hypothesis (2). Panel A of Figure 4 shows that non-pessimistic women do exhibit
positive MWP for coverage at ﬁrst, which decreases with distance from plant. Their MWPC
values become indistinguishable from zero (at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level) at roughly 50
kilometers away from the plant. In contrast, panel B of Figure 4 reveals a positive but con-
stant MWPC for pessimistic women. Non-pessimistic men (Panel C of Figure 4) also exhibit
constant but lower MWPC values. Among pessimistic men (panel B), the sorting eﬀect is
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not only far more marked but also exhibits the inverted U shape predicted by Lemma 2. This
constitutes rather strong empirical evidence with regard to the eﬀect of sorting in space.
By way of contrast, the distance gradients of WTP for solving the waste disposal (and trans-
portation) problem are ﬂat in all cases (not shown). Evaluating WTPW for a non-pessimistic
woman at median sample values (which includes a remaining life expectancy of some 44 years
for women and discounting at 15 percent), one obtains a lifetime WTPW of $960 at a distance
of 36 kilometers from plant. Likewise, the hundredfold of MWP for insurance coverage cor-
responds to the full solution of the problem of ﬁnancial risk associated with operation of the
plant. In this case, lifetime WTP at a distance of 36 km amounts to $1,011, suggesting that (full)
ﬁnancial coverage is valued slightly higher than solving the waste disposal problem, at least by
the Swiss population. For residents located at the power plant, lifetime WTP is maximum at
$3,805. It decreases on average by $63 per km, or $40 per mile, much less than the $200 to 300
per mile reported by Faber (1998) for the United States.
7 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to analyze the eﬀect of distance from nuclear plant on the
WTP for a reduction of two types of risk emanating from these plants, using a stated choice
experiment. In the case of Switzerland, respondents had ample opportunity to choose their
residential location according to their preferences regarding nuclear power. In the case of ra-
dioactive risk associated with the operation of a nuclear plant, this causes distance to play an
ambiguous role. If spatial sorting of individuals is indeed important, one would expect to ﬁnd
more strongly concerned people residing at a greater distance from plants. A simple economic
model of locational choice predicts that such sorting will result in an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between marginal WTP for risk reduction and distance. By way of contrast, distance
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from plant is predicted to be irrelevant for nuclear waste disposal as long as the ﬁnal disposal
site is not decided (as is the case in Switzerland).
In a stated choice experiment, with statistical inference based on the Random Utility
Model, the attributes of electric power (degree of coverage by nuclear liability insurance, solu-
tion of the waste problem, but also number of blackouts, size of damage, and price of electric-
ity) are found to be valued by respondents as hypothesized. More importantly, distance proves
to be a signiﬁcant predictor of marginal WTP for insurance coverage but not of WTP for
having the waste disposal problem solved. Controlling for subjective accident probabilities,
the distance gradient of marginal WTP for insurance coverage turns out to display the pre-
dicted inverted U proﬁle among men (who until recently had the legal authority to determine
a household’s location in Switzerland).
On average, WTP for full insurance coverage amounts to $3,805 at zero distance from nu-
clear power plants, decreasing by $63 per km [$40 per mile, compared to $200 to 300 according
to Faber (1998) for the United States], reaching zero at a distance of 60 km (37 miles). WTP for
solving the waste disposal problem does not depend on distance from plant, again as predicted.
In sum, this research suggests that distance from an environmental disamenity may have
unexpected eﬀects on WTP for risk reduction. Data on real property and housing prices,
being contaminated by regional shifts in supply, are unlikely to permit discovering the demand
eﬀects caused by the sorting in space performed by individuals when choosing their residential
location.
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A More Estimation Results
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e. Coeﬀ. s.e.
CONSTANT 0.62489 0.09024 *** 0.60374 0.09093 *** 0.60554 0.08967 ***
COV,RAG, 0.02053 0.00424 *** 0.00698 0.00238 *** 0.00499 0.00155 ***
NOWAST, 0.35806 0.17971 ** 0.34859 0.17796 ** 0.45605 0.11873 ***
BLACKOuT -0.35731 0.04953 *** -0.35057 0.04924 *** -0.34883 0.04919 ***
DAMAG, -0.00034 0.00087 -0.00025 0.00093 -0.00055 0.00053
OuTLAY -0.00339 0.00029 *** -0.00335 0.00029 *** -0.00336 0.00029 ***
OuTLAY2 1.17E-07 1.11E-08 *** 1.14E-07 1.06E-08 *** 1.14E-07 1.05E-08 ***
DIST·NOWAST, 0.00556 0.00637 0.00625 0.00639 0.00131 0.00167
DIST2·NOWAST, -3.20E-05 5.08E-05 -4.02E-05 5.09E-05
DIST·DAMAG, -2.95E-05 3.58E-05 -3.71E-05 3.98E-05 -2.26E-05 9.84E-06 **
DIST2·DAMAG, 3.80E-08 2.95E-07 1.24E-07 3.36E-07
DIST·COV,RAG, -5.39E-04 1.74E-04 *** -7.38E-05 8.59E-05 1.37E-05 2.22E-05
DIST2·COV,RAG, 3.35E-06 1.43E-06 ** 7.06E-07 6.92E-07
S,XM·NOWAST, -0.18718 0.09561 ** -0.18769 0.09437 ** -0.18912 0.09449 **
S,XM·COV,RAG, -0.01489 0.00426 *** -0.00207 0.00123 * -0.00203 0.00123 *
DIST·S,XM·COV 4.24E-04 1.77E-04 **
DIST2·S,XM·COV -2.11E-06 1.47E-06
P,SS·NOWAST, 0.09246 0.09762 0.09554 0.09702 0.09320 0.09696
P,SS·COV,RAG, -0.01148 0.00451 ** 0.00027 0.00128 0.00038 0.00128
DIST·P,SS·COV 4.04E-04 1.86E-04 **
DIST2·P,SS·COV -2.24E-06 1.54E-06
OPPON,NT·NOWAST, 0.33556 0.12145 *** 0.33387 0.12124 *** 0.33684 0.12118 ***
OPPON,NT·COV,RAG, 0.00194 0.00528 0.00056 0.00162 0.00051 0.00162
DIST·OPP·COV -1.45E-05 2.11E-04
DIST2·OPP·COV -4.02E-07 1.64E-06
INCOM,·OuTLAY 8.16E-09 2.81E-09 *** 8.15E-09 2.82E-09 *** 8.24E-09 2.80E-09 ***
NOINCOM,·OuTLAY 6.94E-04 3.15E-04 ** 6.75E-04 3.16E-04 ** 6.85E-04 3.14E-04 **
lnσ2u 0.10630 0.11006 0.11499 0.11849 0.10655 0.11251
σu 1.05459 0.05803 1.05918 0.06275 1.05472 0.05933
ρ 0.52655 0.02744 0.52872 0.02952 0.52661 0.02805
Log Likelihood -2196.79 -2211.14 -2212.05
N=4, 613; 376 respondents; L0 = −2596.96; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ signiﬁcant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level
Table 5: Random eﬀects probit estimation results. Dependent variable is the probability of
accepting the alternative type of power.
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